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The Supreme Court declared that the segregation of elementary and high school was 
unconstitutional in 1954, through its famous decision in Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka 
1. This decision changed the way America viewed race and the Supreme Court itself. 
Through its decision, the Court believed that the time was right to end segregation. That 
decision was an attempt to initiate social policy; unfortunately, the Court's decisions don't 
implement themselves, That responsibility lies with the other two branches of the federal 
government, the legislature and the executive, as well as with the states. As the nation 
progressed, the Supreme Court faced actions that resisted desegregation, such as the incident in 
Little Rock, Arkansas, in 1957, and reactions by various groups resulted in the passage of the 
Civil Rights Act of 1964. While the Supreme Court continues to stand by its decision, the nation 
continues to debate the issue. I analyze school desegregation cases and show that the Supreme 
Court's power only extends so far before it must rely on other branches of our government. 
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When the Supreme Court declared that the segregation of elementary and high schools 
was unconstitutional in 1954, it changed the way that America viewed race and the Supreme 
Court itself. 
Through its decision in Brown v. Board oj Education oJTopeka 1, I the Court believed 
that the time was right to end segregation. That decision was an attempt to initiate social policy; 
unfortunately, the Court's decisions don't implement themselves. That responsibility lies with 
the other two branches of the federal government, the legislature and the executive, as well as 
with the states. As the nation progressed, the Supreme Court faced factions that resisted 
desegregation, such as the incident in Little Rock, Arkansas, in 1957, and that action resulted in 
the case of Cooper v. Aaron2 that was heard in front of the Supreme Court. The Governor of 
Arkansas attempted to prohibit African-American students from entering a public high school. 
President Eisenhower ordered federal troops to protect the students while they attended the high 
school. Reactions by various groups resulted in the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.3 
While the Supreme Court continued to stand by its decision, the nation continued to debate the 
issue. This thesis focused upon school segregation, but segregation is not easily defined. 
Segregation comes in two forms: de jure segregation and de Jacto segregation. According 
to Black's Law Dictionary, defacto segregation is, "Segregation which is inadvertent and 
without assistance of school authorities and not caused by any state action but rather by social, 
economic and other determinates".4 On the other hand, dejure segregation is defined as: 
"Segregation directly intended or mandated by law or otherwise issuing from an official racial 
classification or in other words to segregation which has or had the sanction oflaw".5 For the 
purpose of this paper, I will only be dealing with Supreme Court cases in which de jure 
segregation was in question. A discussion of segregation is not complete without first looking at 
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the Fourteenth Amendment, and its focus of the equal protection of the laws. This is an integral 
part of our discussion. 
The Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution establishes the idea of the 
equal protection of the law: 
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction 
thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside. No 
State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or 
immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person 
of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person 
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws. 6 
An examination of this amendment is necessary because the state cases involved with school 
desegregation used the Fourteenth Amendment as their bases for claiming discrimination. 
Indeed, the Court granted certiorari to all the state cases discussed based on the plaintiff's claim 
of discrimination under the Fourteenth Amendment. In order to understand the Court's reasoning 
in Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka 1/ one must first examine the case of Plessy v. 
Ferguson,8 in which the Court established the "separate but equal" doctrine that became the basis 
for all racial discrimination cases until 1954. 
In 1890, the legislature in Louisiana enacted a statute that required railroad companies to 
provide equal, but separate, accommodations for whites and African-Americans. In addition, the 
law made it a criminal offense for any person to insist on occupying a seat reserved for a 
passenger of the other race. Plessy, only one-eighth African-American and seven-eighths white, 
refused to give up a seat reserved for a white passenger. During his trial, Plessy petitioned the 
Louisiana State Supreme Court to enjoin the trial judge from continuing the proceedings against 
him. When the court rejected his petition, Plessy brought his case to the U.S. Supreme Court on a 
writ of error. Plessy argued that the law violated the guarantees of the Thirteenth and Fourteenth 
Amendments.9 
Writing the opinion for the Court, Justice Brown looked at each amendment that Plessy 
challenged. With regards to the Thirteenth Amendment, Justice Brown reasoned that the statute 
did not interfere with the abolition of slavery. 
Slavery implies involuntary servitude, - a state of bondage; the ownership of 
mankind as a chattel, or, at least, the control of the labor and services of one man 
for the benefit of another, and the absence of a legal right to the disposal of his 
own person, property, and services. 
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A statute which implies merely a legal distinction between the white and 
colored races ... has no tendency to destroy the legal equality of the two races, or 
re-establish a state of involuntary servitude. Indeed, we do not understand that the 
thirteenth amendment is strenuously relied upon by the plaintiff in error in this 
connection. 10 
Justice Brown then looked at the accusation that the Louisiana statute violated the 
Fourteenth Amendment. Brown reasoned that the intent of the amendment was to enforce the 
absolute equality of the races before the law, but it could not have been intended to abolish 
distinctions based upon race, or to enforce social equality. Laws that permitted or required the 
separation of the races did not necessarily imply the inferiority of either race, and they had been 
generally recognized as within the extent of the power of the state legislatures. II Justice Brown 
further reasoned that the Louisiana statute was a reasonable regulation, and that the state is at 
liberty to act with reference to established customs and traditions of the citizens.12 
Justice Brown also discussed the underlying argument that the forced separation of the 
two races stamped the colored race with a feeling of inferiority. If this was the case, Brown 
reasoned, it was because "the colored race chooses to put that construction upon it.,,13 He also 
reasoned that Plessy's argument assumed that social prejudices could be overcome by legislation 
and that equal rights could not be secured for the Negro race except by force, but Brown 
dismissed that proposition. "If the two races are to meet upon terms of social equality, it must be 
the result of natural affinities, a mutual appreciation of each other' s merits, and a voluntary 
consent of individuals."l4 
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Justice Harlan was the sole dissenting justice. In his dissent, Harlan argued that the 
constitution did not permit any public authority to know the race of those entitled to be protected 
by those rights. Further, "Such legislation as there here in question is inconsistent not only with 
that equality of rights which pertains to citizenship, national and state, but with the personal 
liberty enjoyed by every one within the United States." l5 Harlan further argued that our 
constitution is color-blind, and with respect to civil rights, all citizens are equal under the law. 
Finally, Harlan reasoned that we could not boast about the freedom enjoyed by our citizens, 
while we continued to uphold a state law that degraded a large portion of our fellow citizens.l6 
Plessy and its doctrine of "separate but equal" facilities for African-Americans was 
significant because it provided the "legalistic smoke screen behind which an exploitive society 
operated for the next six decades; for while things were separate, they were rarely, if ever, 
equal."l ? The Court never questioned the standard set forth in Plessy, but it did repeatedly ask if 
separate facilities were truly equal. The Court was increasingly driven to scrutinize the material 
equality of facilities until the case of Sweatt v. Painter, which was decided in 1950. 18 
Heman Sweatt, an African-American, was denied admission to the University of Texas 
Law School because of his race. He brought suit against school officials to compel the university 
to admit him. The trial court denied his request after extending the case six months, in order to 
give Texas time to provide a law school for African-American students. Sweatt refused to attend 
the new law school and continued his action against the university officials. The Texas Court of 
Civil Appeals affirmed the trial court's decision against him, and his subsequent application to 
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the Texas Supreme Court for a writ of error was denied. Sweatt proceeded to petition the U.S. 
S C 1: . . 19 upreme ourt lor certIOrari . 
Chief Justice Vinson wrote the opinion handed down by the Court. He began by 
comparing both the University of Texas Law School and the new university for African-
Americans. The University of Texas Law School was staffed by a faculty of sixteen full-time 
professors, three part-time professors, and some of those members were nationally recognized 
authorities in their field. The student body numbered 850, and the library contained over 65,000 
volumes. The school also offered its students a law review, moot court facilities, scholarship 
funds, and Order of the Coif affiliation. It was considered one of the nation's ranking law 
schools.20 The new university for African-American students, however, had no independent 
faculty or library, at the time ofthe opening of the school, in 1947. Four members of the 
University of Texas Law School taught at the school, but maintained their offices in the original 
university. Few of the 10,000 volumes ordered for the library had arrived, and the school lacked 
accredidation.21 Since the trial, the university had improved, if only fractionally. 22 
Chief Justice Vinson reasoned that the University of Texas Law School was superior to 
the new university for African-American students. The Court could not find substantial 
opportunities offered white and Negro law students by Texas. Further, the Court found it difficult 
to believe that a student who had a free choice between the two schools would consider the 
question close to even, meaning that the student would pick the University of Texas Law 
School.23 In addition, Vinson wrote, "The law school, the proving ground for legal learning and 
practice, cannot be effective in isolation from the individuals and institutions with which the law 
interacts.,,24 Vinson reasoned that preparation for any occupation depended not only on equal 
facilities, but also on those intangibles such as experience that were only open to white students. 
Those experiences could only be gained through interaction with others. With such a substantial 
segment of society excluded, the education offered to Sweatt was not substantially equal to the 
education that he would receive if admitted to the University of Texas Law School.25 The Court 
ruled that the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment required that Sweatt be 
admitted to the University of Texas Law School.26 
6 
The Supreme Court ' s creation of the "separate but equal" doctrine in Plessy remained in 
effect until the Supreme Court, under the direction of Chief Justice Vinson, agreed to hear the 
case of Brown v. Board a/Education a/Topeka, which was a bundle offive separate segregation 
cases.27 The Vinson Court was deeply divided on all issues, including segregation, but had not 
yet decided the actual issue of segregation. "The earlier racial cases - Sweatt and McLaurin-
they had managed to cope with by chipping away at the edges of Jim Crow but avoiding the real 
question of Plessy's continued validity. The Court could no longer dodge that question, though it 
might continue to stall in resolving it.,,28 During conference after arguments, the Justices 
discussed how they would vote. At its first consideration of Brown, the Court was undecided as 
to whether, how, and when it should strike down state-imposed segregation in the nation's 
schools. Four of the Justices - Black, Douglas, Burton, and Minton - were ready to vote in favor 
of ending the practice; Reed was ready to affirm; Frankfurter was ready to overturn Jim Crow 
schools in Washington, D.C.; Vinson and Clark were worried about the uproar of their decision 
and feared domestic strife; and Jackson was willing to overturn Plessy unless a clear majority 
insisted on stating that segregation had been unconstitutional all along.29 
The Justices decided that in order to try to reconcile their differences, they would hold off 
on handing down a decision on Brown at the end of the year. The Court continued to hold 
discussions on the issue, and each Justice had different views on how he thought the Court stood 
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toward the end of the 1952 Session. At the end of the term in June, the Justices' law clerks held a 
luncheon and discussed the case. The clerks were willing to overturn Plessy and order 
desegregation, but they believed that the Court would be closely divided if it had announced its 
decision at that time.3o Justice Frankfurter came up with a reasonable solution to the problem. 
Frankfurter was certain that the Court could hold off a decision until the new term. The Justices 
were not pushing for a decision, they had not taken a vote on the issue throughout the term, and 
if they could come up with some questions for discussion at reargument, the case could hold 
until the next term.3! Justice Frankfurter and this clerk, Alexander Bickel, worked on questions 
that they felt needed to be answered before the Court rendered a decision. The questions looked 
in opposite directions and were worded to ensure that it was clear that the Court had not yet 
reached a decision. The Court unanimously voted to restore the cases to the docket for 
reargument the following term, and the parties to the litigation were given the questions and 
asked to answer them, as they were relevant to their respective cases.32 
Chief Justice Fred Vinson was never given the opportunity to see how the cases would 
tum out. "In his Washington hotel apartment, Fred M. Vinson died of a heart attack at 3: 15 in the 
morning of September 8. He was sixty-three.,,33 The remaining members of the Court attended 
the Chief Justice's burial at his ancestral home, but they did not all grieve equally at his passing. 
Frankfurter hadn't much admired Vinson as either a judge or a man. Further, Frankfurter was 
convinced that Vinson had been the main obstacle to the Court's prospects of reaching a 
judicially defensible settlement to the segregation cases. In Frankfurter's opinion, Vinson's death 
was an act ofGod.34 The only question that remained to be answered was whom President 
Eisenhower would nominate to replace Vinson. Eisenhower chose Earl Warren, governor of 
California.35 
8 
Warren's appointment was an interim one. Eisenhower requested that Warren be in 
Washington for the opening of the new tenn in October, since a full Court was needed to hear 
especially crucial cases. While some Justices were worried about the appointment, especially 
Frankfurter, Warren quickly won the respect of his fellow Justices.36 Warren didn't say much at 
the reargument of Brown. Conference notes from the conference following reargument in 
December 1953, however, show Warren's commitment to desegregation. Warren argued that it 
was time for the Court to detennine whether segregation was allowable in public schools. He 
also discussed his reasoning behind ending Plessy's precedent. "The more I read and hear and 
think, the more I come to conclude that the basis of the principle of segregation and separate but 
equal rests upon the basic premise that the Negro race is inferior.37 Further, Warren believed that 
if the Court abolished segregation, it must do it in a tolerant way, so as not to throw the Deep 
South into tunnoil. "It will take all the wisdom of the Court to do this with a minimum of 
commotion and strife. How we do it is important. At present, my instincts and tentative feelings 
would lead me to say that in these cases we should abolish, in a tolerant way, the practice of 
segregation in public schools.,,38 
Chief Justice Earl Warren delivered the opinion of Brown v. Board of Education of 
Topeka I in 1954. Warren began by stating that although the cases came from several different 
states, including Kansas, South Carolina, Virginia, and Delaware, and were different in facts, 
they were all connected by a common legal question. That justified their consolidated opinion.39 
In each of the cases, Negro children asked the courts to help them obtain admission to public 
schools of their community on a nonsegregated basis. Each time, the children were denied 
admission to schools attended by white children under laws that either required or pennitted 
segregation based on race. The plaintiffs argued that segregation deprived them of the equal 
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protection of the laws under the Fourteenth Amendment. 40 In almost all of the cases, a three-
judge federal district court denied action based on the "separate but equal" doctrine adopted by 
the Court in Plessy v. Ferguson, which stated that equality is accorded when the races are 
provided substantially equal facilities, although the facilities are separate. "The plaintiffs contend 
that segregated public schools are not 'equal ' and cannot be made ' equal,' and that hence they 
are deprived of the equal protection of the laws.,,41 Due to the obvious importance of the 
question, the Court took jurisdiction. 
Chief Justice Warren further discussed the facts surrounding reargument of the case. The 
Court heard rearguments during the 1953 Term, which were based on the questions that 
Frankfurter had created for the litigation. 
Reargument was largely devoted to the circumstances surrounding the adoption of 
the Fourteenth Amendment in 1868. It covered exhaustively consideration of the 
Amendment in Congress, ratification by the states, then existing practices in racial 
segregation, and the views of proponents and opponents of the Amendment.42 
The Court determined from reargument that the results were inconclusive for several reasons, 
including the status of public education at the time that the amendment was adopted. Further, the 
language of the Fourteenth Amendment had no relation to public education. The Court 
established the "separate but equal" doctrine and used that as a determining factor in recent 
cases.
43 Unlike Sweatt v. Painter in 1950, this case involved evidence that both Negro and white 
schools had been equalized, or were in the process of being equalized, with respect to buildings, 
curricula, and other "tangible" factors. Warren noted, therefore, that the Court's decision could 
not merely rest on a comparison of those tangible factors . Instead, the Court must look at the 
effect that segregation has on public education.44 
Warren argued that education was the most important function of state and local 
governments. Because education was required to perform basic public responsibilities, and that it 
10 
was the very foundation of good citizenship, it must be offered to every citizen on equal terms. 
The question before the Court was as follows: "Does segregation of children in public schools 
solely on the basis of race, even though the physical facilities and other 'tangible' factors may be 
equal, deprive the children of the minority group of equal educational opportunities?,,45 The 
Court believed that it did. Following the logic the Court discussed in Sweatt v. Painter, the Court 
stated the damage segregation could cause to children: "To separate them from others of similar 
age and qualifications solely because of their race generates a feeling of inferiority as to their 
status in the community that may affect their hearts and minds in a way unlikely ever to be 
undone.,,46 
The Court ruled that, in the field of public education, the "separate but equal" doctrine 
had no place. Separate facilities were inherently unequal. Further, the plaintiffs had been 
deprived of the equal protection of the laws guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment.47 Due to 
the serious nature of the question and the nature of the result, the Court asked all parties 
involved, including the Attorney General of the United States, to return at a later date to discuss 
implementation. Therefore, Brown 1 declared that segregation was unconstitutional. 
That same term, the Court handed down a decision in Bolling v. Sharpe,48 which was a 
companion case to Brown 1. The case raised a constitutional challenge to racial segregation in 
public schools in the District of Columbia. The Court was faced with a dilemma: "The Equal 
Protection Clause is directed at the states, not the federal government, yet to strike down racial 
segregation everywhere else in the country, but to let it persist in the nation's capital would be-
to use the Court's language - 'unthinkable.",49 The African-American children argued that 
segregation deprived them of due process of the law under the Fifth Amendment. The problem 
that the Court faced was that the Fifth Amendment, which was applicable in the District of 
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Columbia, did not have an equal protection clause, as does the Fourteenth Amendment, which 
only applies to the states.50 But according to the Court: 
The concepts of equal protection and due process, both stemming from our 
American ideal of fairness, are not mutually exclusive. The 'equal protection of 
the laws' is a more explicit safeguard of prohibited unfairness than' due process 
oflaw,' and, therefore, we do not imply that the two are always interchangeable 
phrases. But, as this Court has recognized, discrimination may be so unjustifiable 
as to be violative of due process.51 
The Court asserted that liberty under law couldn't be restricted except for a proper 
governmental objective. Segregation in public education is not related to any proper 
governmental objective, and therefore, it imposes a burden on Negro children within the District 
of Columbia that deprives them of their liberty in violation of the Due Process Clause. 52 The 
Court found that racial segregation in the public schools in the District of Columbia violated the 
Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. 
The following year, the Court rendered a decision in Brown v. Board of Education of 
Topeka II. The intention of this discussion was to discuss implementation of school 
desegregation, as the Court had decided in Brown 1. All of the parties involved in the initial case, 
the United States, and the States of Florida, North Carolina, Arkansas, Oklahoma, Maryland, and 
Texas participated in the oral argument. The presentations demonstrated that substantial steps to 
eliminate segregation of public schools had already been taken throughout the nation. 53 
Full implementation of these constitutional principles may require solution of 
varied local school problems. School authorities have the primary responsibility 
for elucidating, assessing, and solving these problems; courts will have to 
consider whether the action of school authorities constitutes good faith 
implementation of the governing constitutional principles.54 
The Court further explained that due to their proximity to local conditions, the courts that 
originally heard the cases could perform the judicial appraisal. In order to carry out the decrees, 
the courts must be guided by equitable principles, which means that there will have to be 
flexibility in shaping remedies.55 
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In order to ensure that the schools are desegregating their facilities, the courts must 
require that the defendants make a "prompt and reasonable start toward full compliance.,,56 The 
courts may need to consider several administrative and legal problems to ensure that the problem 
of racial segregation be solved. Further, the courts have the responsibility of examining the plans 
that school districts propose to solve the problem.57 Finally, the cases were remanded to the 
several District Courts where the cases originated, and they "must take such proceedings and 
enter such orders and decrees consistent with this opinion as are necessary and proper to admit to 
public schools on a racially nondiscriminatory basis 'with all deliberate speed' the parties to 
these cases.,,58 
Critics of the phrase "with all deliberate speed", including Justice Black, claimed that the 
phrase itself retarded, rather than advanced, the hopes of compliance. In a television interview in 
December 1968, Justice Black claimed, "It seems to me, probably, with all due deference to the 
opinion and my brethren, all of them, that it would have been better - maybe - I don't say 
positively - not to have that sentence.,,59 The nation and the Court experienced several 
disappointments, delays, and frustrations following the decision in 1955. The Court, however, 
remained committed to desegregating schools, and it emphasized that commitment on one 
particular occasion three years after the 1955 decision.6o In 1958, the Court heard arguments and 
rendered a decision in Cooper v. Aaron.61 
In early 1958, several members of the Little Rock School Board and the superintendent 
of schools filed a petition in federal district court requesting a two-and-on-half-year 
postponement of their desegregation program. They argued that hostility to desegregation was so 
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deep that their high school could not offer a decent educational program. They proposed that the 
African-American students who had enrolled in the school in late 1957 be transferred to 
segregated schools.62 This controversy arose from the Little Rock School Board attempting to 
comply with the Court's decisions in Brown I and Brown II and the attempt by Governor Orval 
Faubus, the Arkansas governor, to frustrate the implementation of the school board's 
desegregation program. 
The plan that school officials had devised in 1955 called for complete desegregation of 
the entire school system by 1963. The first stage of the plan included the admission of nine 
African-American students to Central High School in September 1957. There were indications 
that the plan would succeed. 
From discussions with citizen groups, the school board was able to conclude that 
the large majority of citizens thought that desegregation was in the best interests 
of the students. The mayor believed that the police force was adequate to deal 
with any incidents, and up until two days prior to the opening of school, there had 
been no crowds gathering or threats ofviolence.63 
State government officials, however, had been adopting measures that were designed to maintain 
school segregation. For example, in 1956, the state legislature added an amendment to the 
Arkansas Constitution that required the General Assembly to oppose the Supreme Court 
decisions in both Brown cases, as long as it was constitutional. In early 1957, the legislature 
passed several laws making attendance at racially mixed schools optional and establishing a 
State Sovereignty Commission. The measures came to a culmination right before the school 
opened. "Finally, on September 2, 1957, Governor Orval Faubus sent Arkansas National Guard 
units to Little Rock to prevent the nine students from attending the high school.,,64 The action, 
which escalated the opposition of the town's citizens to the plan, prompted the school board to 
ask that the African-American students not attend the high school and to petition the federal 
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district court for further instructions. The court ordered school officials to continue their plans 
for desegregation, but the National Guard continued to prevent the students from attending the 
school. 65 Following an investigation and hearings, the district court enjoined both the governor 
and the National Guard from interfering with the plan. The situation only escalated further: 
On September 23, African-American students attended the high school under 
police protection, but were withdrawn later that day when it became too difficult 
for the police to control crowds that gathered around the school. Two days later, 
the students were once again admitted, this time under the protection of federal 
troops sent to Little Rock by President Dwight Eisenhower to enforce the order of 
the federal distri ct court. 66 
Due to these events, the school board members petitioned the district court for the 
postponement. While the district court ruled in favor of the petition, the U.S. Court of Appeals 
for the Eighth Circuit reversed the decision on appeal. This led the school board to appeal to the 
Supreme Court.67 The opinion, authored by all nine justices, was a masterpiece of judicial 
leadership. 
The Court began by emphasizing the fact that the case involves actions by the Governor 
and State Legislature of Arkansas upon the premise that they are not bound by federal court 
orders, specifically Brown. The Court asserts that the holding in Brown was that "the Fourteenth 
Amendment forbids States to use their governmental powers to bar children on racial grounds 
from attending school where there is state participation through any arrangement, management, 
funds or property.,,68 The Court further stated that it rejected the contentions that the Little Rock 
School Board's plan to completely desegregate schools be suspended until state laws were 
further challenged and tested in the courtS.69 
The Court continued by explaining that it accepted the findings of the District Court, 
which found that the progress of all students, both white and black, suffered and would continue 
to suffer if the conditions that prevailed the prior year were permitted to continue. The Court did 
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assert that the significance of the findings should be considered in light of the fact, that they 
conditions were directly traceable to the legislature and executive officials of Arkansas. Further, 
the Court emphasized that the members of the School Board and the Superintendent of Schools 
were local officials, and in that capacity, the Fourteenth Amendment recognizes them as agents 
of the State.70 The Court also recognized that, "The record before us clearly establishes that the 
growth of the Board's difficulties to a magnitude beyond its unaided power to control is the 
product of state action. Those difficulties ... can also be brought under control by state action.,,7l 
The Fourteenth Amendment holds that no "State" can deny to any person within its 
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws. The Court elaborated by stating that because the 
State acts by its legislative, its executive, and its judicial authorities, the amendment means that 
no agency or officers that act through the State, can deny any person the equal protection of the 
laws.72 "In short, the constitutional rights of children not to be discriminated against in school 
admission on grounds of race or color declared by this Court in the Brown case can neither be 
nullified openly and directly by state legislators or state executive or judicial officers, nor 
nullified indirectly by them through evasive schemes for segregation ... ,,73 The Court then 
examined the claim by the Governor and the Legislature that they were not bound by the Court's 
holding in Brown. The Court ruled that their claim was incorrect and cited the Supremacy Clause 
of Article VI of the Constitution, which states: 
This Constitution, and the laws of the United States which shall be made in 
pursuance thereof; and all treaties made, or which shall be made, under the 
authority of the United States, shall be the supreme law of the land; and the judges 
in every state shall be bound thereby, anything in the Constitution or laws of any 
State to the contrary notwithstanding.74 
The Court made it clear that, " ... the responsibility for public education is primarily the 
concern of the States, but it is equally true that such responsibilities, like all other state activity, 
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must be exercised consistently with federal constitutional requirements as they apply to state 
action.,,75 The State could not legally deny any person equal protection of the laws. Finally, the 
Court recognized that three new Justices had joined the Court since the 1955 decision. Those 
Justices, however, agreed with the other members of the Court concerning the decision, and the 
Brown decision was reaffirmed. The Court finished its opinion by stating that, "The principles 
announced in that decision and the obedience of the States to them, according to the command of 
the Constitution, are indispensable for the protection of the freedoms guaranteed by our 
fundamental charter for all ofus.,,76 
Some cases that made it all the way to the Supreme Court didn't gain the same amount of 
attention as others. Goss v. Board of Education 77 is one such case. Goss begins in Tennessee, 
when two school boards proposed desegregation plans that called for the rezoning of school 
districts without any reference to race. Further, each plan contained a provision under which any 
student would be allowed to transfer from a school where the student would be in the racial 
minority back to the student's original segregated school. This provision was completely based 
on the student's race, as well as the racial composition of the assigned school.78 Upon further 
investigation, it appeared that the provision was specifically designed to move students in one 
direction: across racially neutral lines and back into segregated schools. African-American 
students challenged the validity of the plans.79 
The Court examined the transfer plans and determined that those plans were "a one-way 
ticket leading to but one destination, i.e., the majority race of the transferee and continued 
segregation."so The Court further stated that any classification based on race for the purpose of 
transfer between public schools, as was present in the transfer plans, violated the Equal 
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Therefore, the transfer plans promoted 
discrimination and were invalid.81 
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In 1964, the Court handed down a decision in Griffin v. County School Board of Prince 
Edward County.82 In 1954, when the Court handed down its decision in Brown I, it decided that 
Virginia school segregation laws were unconstitutional and ordered that African-American 
students in Prince Edward County be admitted to public schools. In 1959, the county school 
board decided not to appropriate funds to public schools. Tax credits, however, were given for 
contributions to private white schools. 83 Students that attended those private schools became 
eligible for county and state tuition grants the following year, while public schools continued to 
operate throughout Virginia. The local federal court ordered that the public schools be 
reopened.84 
In its opinion, the Court ruled that the closing of the Prince Edward County schools while 
public schools in every other county of Virginia remained open denied African-American 
children the equal protection of the laws.85 The Court further recognized that, "Virginia law, as 
here applied, unquestionably treats the school children of Prince Edward differently from the 
way it treats the school children of all other Virginia counties. ,,86 Prince Edward County children 
were required to either attend a private school or none at all, while all other Virginia children 
were allowed to go to public schools. African-American children living in Prince Edward County 
are especially hurt because they have no other schools to attend; white children have the option 
of attending a private school. While a State does have the discretion in deciding whether certain 
laws will operate statewide or in only certain counties, the laws presented have one intention: to 
segregate white and African-American children, with regard to school. The Court stated that, 
"Whatever nonracial grounds might support a State's allowing a county to abandon public 
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schools, the object must be a constitutional one, and grounds of race and opposition to 
desegregation do not qualify as constitutional.,,87 Finally, the Court ruled that the time for "all 
deliberate speed" ran out, and that certain phrase could no longer justify denying the children of 
Prince Edward County their constitutional rights to an equal education that was available in other 
parts of the state.88 
Rogers v. Paul89 is another case that made it to the Supreme Court, but didn' t receive as 
much attention as some of the other cases. This case began when a school system in Arkansas 
adopted a desegregation plan that was known as a "grade-a-year" plan. The plan started at the 
lower grades, but it left some high school students attending segregated classes. Further, the 
African-American high school students attended a school that didn't offer the same courses as 
the white high school. Those African-American students challenged not only the situation, but 
also the division of faculty on a racial basis at every grade leve1.9o 
The Court began by looking at certain facts of the case. It stated that the students in the 
case were assigned to a Negro high school on the basis of their race. The Court reasoned: "Those 
assignments are constitutionally forbidden not only for the reasons stated in Brown .. . but also 
because petitioners are thereby prevented from taking certain courses offered only at another 
high school limited to white students.,,91 The Court further ruled that the students had the right to 
question the policy regarding the allocation of faculty. That right came from two different, but 
related, theories. First, racial allocation of faculty denied students equality of educational 
opportunities. Second, it would render an upcoming constitutional desegregation plan 
inadequate.92 Therefore, the Court held that the students were entitled to immediate relief and 
that pending a constitutional desegregation plan, those students were entitled to an immediate 
transfer to a school that had a more extensive curriculum.93 
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The Court continued to decide public education desegregation cases, and it followed its 
precedent set in Brown n, when it used the term "with all deliberate speed" to refer to the time 
needed to implement desegregation plans across the nation. This all changed when the Court 
heard Alexander v. Holmes County Board of Education.94 The case came up for review after the 
Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals granted a motion allowing additional time and delayed 
implementation of a desegregation plan in Mississippi. An earlier order mandated desegregation 
in various Mississippi school districts that educated thousands of students. The delay itself was 
challenged.95 
The Court held that every school district was obligated to terminate dual school systems 
immediately and begin to operate only unitary schools.96 Further, the Court stated that 
"continued operation of segregated schools under a standard of allowing 'all deliberate speed' 
for desegregation is no longer constitutionally permissible.,,97 The Court did, however, allow the 
original District Court and Court of Appeals to hear objections and proposed amendments. 
Although implementation could no longer be delayed, modifications and objections to the order 
could still be considered. Further, delays could not be granted, and all courts were required to 
review any amendments to desegregation plans, and those amendments should only be permitted 
if they strove to further the ultimate goal of desegregation. 98 
The Court continued to tackle desegregation cases, but things had begun to change. The 
Court now had to distinguish between the two different types of segregation: de jure segregation 
and de facto segregation.99 As the Court described, "Proof of 'intent to discriminate' is critical to 
establishing the occurrence of de jure segregation, for only intentional discrimination by the state 
on the basis ofrace violates the Fourteenth Amendment."loo It is critical to understand the limits 
the Court has placed on certain remedies that can be founded legally by the federal courts. Two 
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Supreme Court cases illustrate these limits on remedies: Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board 
oj Education 101 and Milliken v. Bradley.102 
In 1971, the Court handed down a decision in Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board oj 
Education. 103 In this case, about 60% of the African-American students in a town in North 
Carolina still attended schools that were 99% African-American, even though 71 % of all 
students in the system were white. Two proposed desegregation plans were created by the school 
board and a court-appointed expert, Dr. John Finger, and submitted to district Judge James 
McMilan. 104 The district court accepted a modified version of the school board's plan that 
involved the assignment of faculty and the redrawing of attendance zone lines that were used to 
assign students to various junior high schools and high schools. The court, however, approved 
Finger's plan, which required bussing several hundred students, as well as redrawing zone 
lines. lOS The school board objected to the use of buses and appealed the order. On appeal, a 
federal appellate court vacated that particular part of McMilan's order. He, in tum, issued a 
sweeping order, incorporating Finger's proposals and requiring district-wide busing. 106 
First, the Court stated that the main objective is to eliminate all vestiges of state-imposed 
segregation from public schools. If school authorities failed in their obligations under those 
holdings, judicial authority may be invoked. Further, "Once a right and a violation have been 
shown, the scope of a district court's equitable powers to remedy past wrongs is broad and 
flexible ... ,,107 That judicial authority, however, only enters when local authority defaults. 
Second, the Court tackled four major issues that were central to the case. 1) Remedial plans were 
to be judged by their effectiveness. Further, the very limited use of mathematical ratios or quotas 
are good 'starting points' for solutions; 2) predominately African-American or exclusive 
African-American schools, such as those in the case, should be scrutinized very carefully to 
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ensure that they are not segregated schools; 108 3) the pairing and grouping of noncontiguous 
school zones is a permissible tool; and 4) no rigid guidelines can be established concerning the 
busing of students to particular schools. l09 As is evident in Swann, the Court understood that "it 
may be necessary for a district court to require busing in the achievement of racial balance 
among schools afflicted with de jure segregation so as to effectively dismantle a dual educational 
system."IIO 
The Court, however, treated the case of Milliken v. Bradleyl'l in 1974 differently. Ronald 
Bradley, along with several other African-American students, and the Detroit branch of the 
NAACP brought a suit against Governor Milliken, the state board of education, state officials, 
and the city school board and superintendent. They alleged that racial segregation was present in 
the operation of the public school system, specifically in the drawing of school district 
boundaries. The challenge was upheld by a federal district court, which ordered the school board 
to formulate desegregation plans for the school system and ordered state officials to design 
arrangements for a unitary system of education for the metropolitan area. 112 The court also 
allowed some 85 surrounding school districts, not found to be engaged in unconstitutional 
actions, to appear and present arguments that was relevant to forming a regional plan for racial 
balance in the schools. 113 "What was in question was the constitutionality of the court-ordered 
desegregation plan extending to outlying districts with no history of segregative action on the 
part of their school boards or local governments.,,1l4 
A divided Court ruled that it appeared that the District Court and the Court of Appeals 
moved the focus from a Detroit remedy to a metropolitan area because they concluded that 
complete desegregation of Detroit would not produce a desirable racial balance. I IS Chief Justice 
Burger, the author of the decision, stated that the dissenting Justices viewed the existence of a 
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dual system in Detroit could be made the basis for a decree that required cross-district 
transportation. Chief Justice Burger argued against that view could not be supported "on the 
grounds that it represents merely the devising of a suitably flexible remedy for the violation of 
rights already established by our prior decisions.,,116 The Court, therefore, ruled, "it was 
improper to impose a multidistrict remedy for single-district de jure segregation ... ,,117 Without 
any evidence that the other districts had failed to operate a unitary system and that the boundary 
lines had been drawn to foster racial segregation, the Court stated that an interdistrict remedy 
was not constitutionally justified or required. I IS 
Milliken, unlike quite a few of the important desegregation cases, was not unanimous. 
Justices White, Douglas, Brennan, and Marshall all dissented from the opinion. As they pointed 
out in their dissent, "a remedy so limited - in that case, one limited to redrawing attendance 
zones and busing solely within the Detroit city limits - will become less and less meaningful, 
given that urban areas are increasingly populated by African-Americans, encircled by largely all-
white suburbs." I 19 
Another case that divided the Court was Washington v. Seattle School District No.1, 120 
which was decided in 1982. In 1978, Seattle adopted a desegregation plan that used mandatory 
busing, which was quite extensive. A few months following the adoption of the plan, the voters 
of Washington voted to adopt a plan to terminate mandatory busing in order to ensure racial 
integration. This prohibited school boards from assigning students to any school other than the 
one that was geographically closest to their home. As part of the plan, racial balance was not one 
of the seven permissible exceptions. Seattle and two other districts joined in a suit against the 
state, claiming that the proposed plan violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment. 121 
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Justice Blackmun, writing the opinion for the divided Court, held that the proposed plan 
did violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 122 The Court stated that 
the proposed plan, our Initiative 350, must be overturned because it did not attempt to distribute 
governmental power based on any general principle. As the Court pointed out, "Instead, it uses 
the racial nature of an issue to define the governmental decisionmaking structure, and thus 
imposes substantial and unique burdens on racial minorities.,,1 23 The Court did point out that 
busing for integration gave rise to more controversy. In the absence of a constitutional violation, 
however, the success of school desegregation were now matters of the legislative process. 124 
Along with Supreme Court decisions, the other branches of the federal government were 
acting. On June 19, 1963, President John F. Kennedy relayed a special message to Congress. In 
this message, the President requested that Congress remain in session until it had created a bill 
that Kennedy called the Civil Rights Act of 1963. 125 Kennedy further asked the Congress not 
only to include provisions on voting rights and the Civil Rights Commission, but also legislation 
guaranteeing equal access to public accommodations and non-discrimination in federally assisted 
programs. Unfortunately, the first session of the Congress took no real action on the measure. 126 
Kennedy's assassination in November 1963 changed the outcome of the Civil Rights Act of 
1963, especially what provisions the act contained. 
President Johnson succeeded President Kennedy after Kennedy's assassination in 
November 1963. President Johnson's attitude toward civil rights drastically changed from the 
time when he was a senator. As a senator, Johnson had expressed contempt for those who wanted 
to achieve racial equality through legislation. Johnson knew, however, that he needed to change 
his stance on civil rights if he wanted to win re-election in 1964. Therefore, Johnson gave top 
priority to civil rights. '''Let this session of Congress,' he said in his first State of the Union 
24 
message, 'be known as the session which did more for civil rights than the last hundred sessions 
combined. ",1 27 Johnson was a powerful Senator during his years in the Senate, but he was even 
more powerful as President. Johnson had the vast resources of the highest office at his disposal, 
and he ardently fought for a strong civil rights law. 128 President Johnson greatly expanded 
President Kennedy's version of the Civil Rights Act of 1963, but only on certain titles. 
The most important provision for racial equality within the act comes from Title II. 
President Kennedy simply wanted to ensure that all citizens had equal access to public facilities. 
President Johnson expanded this provision: it barred racial discrimination in all public facilities, 
if their operations affected commerce. 129 This strengthened the impact of the provision, since 
now Congress could enforce it through its power to regulate commerce granted by Article I, 
Section 8 of the Constitution. Further, Kennedy's version of the bill had avoided any mention of 
employment discrimination, something that the House Judiciary Committee added during its 
conferences. This added provision ultimately became Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 
1964. 130 Further, President Kennedy had requested that a provision on school desegregation and 
federally funded programs appear in the act, but Johnson's leadership made the request a reality. 
In 1964, under the leadership of President Lyndon B. Johnson, Congress enacted the 
Civil Rights Act of 1964. The act contains eleven titles, one of which deals specifically with 
school desegregation, Title IV. Section 401 defines terms that would be used throughout the 
particular section. Sec 402 allowed the Education Commissioner to conduct a survey within two 
years of the enactment of the title, which concerned the lack of availability of equal educational 
opportunities for individuals due to their race, color, religion, or national origin. 131 Section 403 
allowed the Commissioner to provide technical assistance to applicants in the preparation, 
adoption, and implementation of plans for the desegregation of public schools. 132 Section 404 
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authorizes the Commissioner to create either short-term or regular training sessions designed to 
improve the ability of teachers and other school personnel to deal with special education 
problems that are a result of desegregation. 133 Section 405 allows the Commissioner to make 
grants to school boards to pay for inservice training for teachers and other school personnel in 
dealing with desegregation problems and to employ specialists to advise teachers during those 
problems. 134 Section 406 deals with payments for a grant may be made either in advance or 
through reimbursement. 135 Section 407 allows the Attorney General to initiate and maintain 
appropriate legal proceedings in the event that he receives a signed complaint from a parent or 
group of parents whose children are being deprived of the equal protection of the laws, as well as 
those who are denied admission to a university based on their race, color, religion, or national 
. . 136 
ongm. 
The impact of Title IV of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 became apparent quickly. At the 
time of the debate on the legislation, almost two-thirds of segregated school districts had still not 
given African-American children their constitutional rights. 137 Title IV of the act enabled the 
federal government to bring suits in court for school desegregation. The bill simply implemented 
the law that was interpreted by the Supreme Court and ensured that all citizens enjoyed their 
constitutional rights. 138 The bill, however, did not guarantee racial balance in the nation's 
schools; it only ensured that schools would no longer remain segregated. The bill did not provide 
any plan to ensure that schools would not be affected by de facto segregation, only de jure 
segregation. Title VI of the bill was also an important and powerful tool for legislatures in a 
different way. 
Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 deals with federally funded programs. 
In Title VI, Congress has made a broad use of such power by providing that there 
is to be no racial discrimination in any program receiving federal financial 
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assistance. More important, Title VI goes on to provide that compliance with the 
nondiscrimination requirement is to be effected by the tennination of or refusal to 
grant federal funds to any recipient who has been found guilty of any racial 
discrimination. 139 
The concept is genius, since Congress is essentially using its "power of the purse" to ensure that 
racial discrimination is gone. Sections 601 and 602 of Title VI deal with desegregation. Section 
601 asserts that no person living in the United States shall be denied participation in, denied the 
benefits, or suffer discrimination in any program that receives federal financial assistance, based 
on their race, color, or national origin. 140 Section 602 went a bit further. "Section 602 of the Act 
authorized Federal departments and agencies to issue 'rules, regulations, or orders of general 
applicability' to implement the purposes of the statute.,,141 These Sections, as well as others, led 
the U.S. Office of Education to issue a Statement of Policies for School Desegregation, also 
known as 'guidelines' .142 
Title VI was created to ensure that all citizens of the United States, regardless of their 
race, color, or national origin, who wanted federal financial aid, would receive it. Those 
opposing the bill claimed that it would permit the federal government to control all facets of 
education and broad aspects of everyday life. Supporters disagreed and argued that the bill would 
only ensure that which it stated, and it would not permit the federal government to control the 
contents of any educational program. 143 The main impact that Title VI had on education was that 
any schools that requested federal financial assistance had to prove that it was desegregated. If 
the school could not prove that it was desegregated or on the way to desegregation, that school 
would receive no federal financial assistance. This effectively forced schools to develop and 
implement desegregation plans quickly and efficiently. 
In order to implement the Title VI mandate of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the 
Department of Health, Education, and Welfare was asked to prepare certain "guidelines". These 
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guidelines have two purposes: "(1) to indicate to local and state authorities what is necessary for 
compliance with federal law; (2) they bind the agency in this one aspect of the determination of 
eligibility for federal funds.,,144 These guidelines have been given substantial weight by the 
courts in dealing with issues of desegregation. Among those guidelines established by the HEW, 
the fall of 1967 was set as the target date for total desegregation of all grades. 145 
In 1966, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals rendered a decision in United States v. 
Jefferson County Board of Education. 146 In this case, the Circuit Court had to review 
desegregation plans to ensure that they met constitutional standards, as well as the new standards 
set forth in the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the guidelines established by the United States 
Office of Education, Department of Health, Education, and Welfare (HEW).147 The Appeals 
Court claimed that the guidelines offered new hope to African-American children who had 
previously been denied their constitutional rights. The Appeals Court also discussed the HEW 
guidelines in more depth. 
HEW Guidelines are based on decisions of this and other courts, are formulated to 
stay within the scope of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, are prepared in detail by 
experts in education and school administration, and are intended by Congress and 
the executive to be part of a coordinated national program. The Guidelines present 
the best system available for uniform application, and the best aid to the courts in 
evaluating the validity of a school desegregation plan and the progress made 
under that plan. 148 
The Court of Appeals then turned to the question of whether or not the HEW Guidelines 
are within the scope of congressional and executive policies set forth in the Civil Rights Act of 
1964. 149 The Appeals Court held that they were and explained that one of the first "guidelines" 
set forth was the time requirement for total desegregation throughout the nation. "These 
Guidelines fixed the fall of 1967 as the target date for total desegregation of all grades.,,150 
Continuing through its opinion, the Appeals Court explained how the Guidelines fell within the 
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scope of the policies set forth within the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and further claimed what the 
Guidelines do not entail: 
The HEW Guidelines agree with decisions of this circuit and of the similarly 
situated Fourth and Eighth Circuits. And they stay within the Congressional 
mandate. There is no cross-district or cross-town bussing requirement. There is no 
provision requiring school authorities to place white children in Negro schools or 
Negro children in white schools for the purpose of striking a racial balance in a 
school or school district proportionate to the racial population of the community 
or school district. lsi 
The main component of the Guidelines is to ensure that schools are implementing approved 
desegregation plans in a timely fashion. Although this was not a Supreme Court case, I believe 
the case needed to be included in my research since its contents dealt strictly with HEW 
Guidelines as they pertained to school desegregation. 
Congress is in charge of writing laws, the Executive Branch is in charge of enforcing the 
laws, and the Supreme Court is in charge of interpreting the laws. The power of judicial review 
that the Supreme Court possesses came from their decision in Marbury v. Madison, 152 which 
means that the Supreme Court has the power to review laws and determine their 
constitutionality. The now famous case also illustrated the power behind the Supreme Court 
itself. We have seen, however, that whatever "power" the Supreme Court may have, is 
figurative, not literal. The Supreme Court may interpret the laws of our nation, but it is up to the 
other branches of the federal government, the legislature and the executive, as well as the states 
themselves, to implement those laws. More specifically, the President and the rest of the 
Executive Branch, has the most power and the best chance of enforcing the decisions of the 
Supreme Court. 
The President and the rest of the Executive Branch have the power of the nation. He 
initiates policy to suit his campaign goals, but he can't make laws himself. Nor can he interpret 
29 
them. The only thing that the President is allowed to do is enforce those laws, as well as the 
decisions of the Supreme Court. This power is most evident during the fight for desegregation, 
especially during Eisenhower and Kennedy's presidencies. Following the decision rendered in 
Brown II, the governor of Arkansas ordered the National Guard to not allow the African-
American students to enter the high school. In order for the students to enter the high school, 
President Eisenhower sent federal troops down to Little Rock to escort the students inside the 
building. State officials in Arkansas attempted to disobey the order from the Supreme Court, and 
it took action from the President of the United States to force the state to comply with the Court's 
order. Kennedy and his predecessor, Johnson, pushed the Civil Rights Act of 1964 through 
Congress to ensure that no person living in the United States would be denied equal protection of 
the laws. 
The legislature is also responsible for enforcing the Supreme Court's decisions. If one of 
the laws of our nation is deemed unconstitutional, it is up to Congress to re-write the law to make 
sure that it is compliance with the Constitution. Congress even wrote the Civil Rights Act of 
1964, which made it illegal to discriminate against someone based on his race, color, religion, or 
national origin. Further, Congress may create institutions and federal organizations in order to 
ensure that the nation is complying with the Court's orders. This is evident in Title IV and Title 
VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as well as the creation of the HEW Guidelines. 
Perhaps the most interesting agents of the Supreme Court in enforcing its decisions are 
the states themselves. Every state has its own Constitution and its own laws. Congress, however, 
can supersede those laws by amending the U.S. Constitution, which the states must also follow. 
The incident in Arkansas in 1957 is evidence enough about the kind of power that the states 
possess. The governor used his constitutional power given to him by the Arkansas Constitution 
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to call in the National Guard to ensure that the African-American students were not permitted to 
enter the high school. That power was overshadowed by presidential power. President 
Eisenhower used his power to send federal troops into Arkansas to make sure that the state 
complied with the Court's decision. That incident alone shows just how far the states can use 
their own power. It took intervention on the national executive level to force compliance. 
The Supreme Court attempted to initiate social policy when it declared that segregation 
was unconstitutional. Its decisions don't implement themselves: that is the responsibility of the 
other two branches of the federal government, the executive and the legislature, as well as the 
states. The following passage illustrates this idea perfectly: 
Compliance, however, was dependent upon the continued and aggressive support 
of others: Presidents like Kennedy and Johnson, ready and willing to send in 
federal marshals or troops to force compliance; an active Attorney General like 
Robert Kennedy, persistently filing suits against segregated districts; a federal 
agency like HEW, willing to cut off federal school aid to noncomplying areas; 
ever-present interest groups such as the NAACP, which provided financial help, 
lawyers, and research support to black plaintiffs bringing suit to challenge 
segregated facilities; and a lower federal judiciary whose members had to 
withstand enormous community pressures. IS3 
The Supreme Court is a powerful entity. Part of our system of federal government, 
however, ensures that no one branch of the government becomes too strong. That's called checks 
and balances. The three federal branches of the government check each other and balance each 
other in order to ensure that no one branch becomes too powerful. That aspect of our federal 
government is important and essential, but it is also detrimental, especially in this instance. I 
have shown that the Supreme Court's power only extends so far before it must rely on other 
branches of our government. 
Federal agencies, special interest groups, and lower federal courts must cooperate with 
each other in order for desegregation to succeed. Throughout this paper, I have attempted to 
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show that desegregation is still an issue in this country. The Supreme Court declared school 
segregation unconstitutional in 1954, but I have shown that the nation continues to debate the 
issue. De jure segregation may have been deemed unconstitutional, but de facto segregation is 
still a problem in some areas of our country. Our own intolerance is the reason for that existence. 
The only way for the nation to completely move forward and finally live together in harmony is 
for us to set aside our differences and work together. School segregation is unconstitutional. The 
Supreme Court declared that mandate. Now the States and the federal executive and legislature 
must enforce that mandate. 
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